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Abstract We replicate three tasks for which Gneezy, List and Wu (Q. J. Econ.
121(4):1283–1309, 2006) document the so-called uncertainty effect: People value a
binary lottery over non-monetary outcomes less than other people value the lottery’s
worse outcome. While the authors implement verbal lottery descriptions, we use a
physical lottery format and also provide subjects with complete information about
the goods they are to value. We observe for all three pricing tasks that subjects’ will-
ingness to pay for the lottery is significantly higher than other subjects’ willingness
to pay for the lottery’s worse outcome.
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1 Introduction
Most theories of decision making under risk require that the value of any risky
prospect lie between the value of the prospect’s best and worst outcomes. Gneezy
et al. (2006, henceforth GLW) term this requirement the internality axiom (henceforth
IA) and document its systematic violations.1 For various valuation goods (bookstore
gift certificates, one-year deferred payments, sports cards, and work effort), elici-
tation modes (pricing and choice), and implementation variants (hypothetical and
real-stakes, laboratory and field experiments), GLW demonstrate that people value
equiprobable binary lotteries less than other people value the lotteries’ worse out-
comes.
GLW argue that the IA violations are due to an uncertainty effect triggered by two
lottery design features that obstruct the IA. First, their lotteries involve non-monetary
outcomes, the valuation of which may induce higher cognitive demands or percep-
tion of uncertainty. Second, the between-subjects design makes it less likely that sub-
jects value the lotteries based on directly valuing their outcomes. GLW propose that
subjects value the expectation of the outcomes’ face values and discount the valu-
ation for the risk involved in the lottery. This “risk and return” valuation process—
incompatible with most theories of decision making under risk—could indeed explain
the observed IA violations if high risk premia were levied on equiprobable or similar
lotteries (as opposed to lotteries with more unequal probability mixes).2
We replicate three of GLW’s tasks, namely hypothetical and real-stakes pricing of
bookstore gift certificates, and hypothetical pricing of one-year deferred payments.
We find no evidence for IA violations and, hence, for the uncertainty effect. In all
three pricing tasks, subjects’ willingness to pay for the lotteries is significantly higher
than other subjects’ willingness to pay for the lotteries’ worse outcomes. It therefore
seems that the uncertainty effect phenomenon is less robust than GLW’s results sug-
gest.
As discussed in Ortmann et al. (2007) and in Sect. 2.1 below, our replication
study was initially motivated by the concern that GLW’s experimental instructions—
describing the lottery structure verbally and constructing a conceptual divide between
the lottery ticket to be valued and the lottery outcomes—could have been misinter-
preted by subjects, thus possibly contributing to the observed IA violations. In order
to increase the transparency of the lottery structure, all but two of our lottery treat-
ments use a “physical” format: Subjects state their willingness to pay for the oppor-
tunity of drawing a good (a gift certificate or a deferred payment form) from a closed
bag containing two goods that are identical except for their face value. The experi-
menter physically demonstrates the lottery structure. Unlike GLW, we also equip
subjects with complete information about the goods they are to value.
1In their footnote 1, GLW discuss theories of decision making under risk that in principle permit IA viola-
tions. While the IA is seemingly derived from deterministic theories, its empirical tests have implications
for stochastic theories as well.
2In the hypothetical pricing of gift certificates, the IA is violated not only for equiprobable lotteries but also
for lotteries with probability mixes of (0.6, 0.4) and (0.4, 0.6). For lotteries with more unequal probability
mixes, the IA is not violated.
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Several other studies have investigated IA violation in GLW’s or closely related
tasks. Keren and Willemsen (2009) replicate GLW’s hypothetical pricing and choice
of gift certificates, using various lottery descriptions and ex-post lottery comprehen-
sion tests. When the lottery is described as in GLW or is reworded but still purely
verbal, the IA is violated or not supported, and the comprehension rates are only
29–43%. By contrast, when the lottery is described by a coin flip or a spinner wheel,
the IA is overall weakly supported and the comprehension rates rise to 69–87%. In
each task, IA violation seems to occur only for subsets of subjects failing the com-
prehension test. While these findings are illuminating, we note that GLW did use a
coin-flip lottery description in their real-stakes gift-certificate task, yet observed IA
violation. Also, Keren and Willemsen’s coin-flip and spinner-wheel lottery descrip-
tions are still verbal (compared to our physical lottery format) and retain the lottery-
ticket or lottery-participation terminology, which might have contributed to the still
noticeable proportion of subjects failing the comprehension test.
Simonsohn (2009, Experiment 1) conducts the hypothetical pricing of gift certifi-
cates, but his design differs from GLW in that the lotteries involve pairs of bookstore
and restaurant gift certificates in various mixtures. Also, subjects in a baseline (cer-
tainty) treatment value both certificates involved in the corresponding lottery treat-
ment.3 Simonsohn further slightly rewords GLW’s lottery instructions to make the
lottery structure more transparent. Despite that, the IA is always violated, in most
cases strongly. In Experiment 2, Simonsohn replicates GLW’s lottery treatment for
the hypothetical pricing of bookstore gift certificates, adapting the reworded lottery
instructions from Experiment 1 and implementing two ex-post lottery comprehension
tests. The comprehension rate turns out lower for subjects facing Keren and Willem-
sen’s test (79%) compared to subjects facing a multiple-choice, logically equivalent
test (92%).4 The high comprehension rates in Experiment 2, combined with the ex-
tensive IA violation in the related Experiment 1, cast some doubt on the aforemen-
tioned conjecture that the IA violations observed in GLW were due to misinterpreta-
tion of the lottery instructions.5
Sonsino (2008) observes IA violations even in a within-subjects design. In his
web-based experiment, subjects first value three gift certificates with widely differ-
ent, undisclosed market prices,6 having complete information about the certificates
similar to our design. Then each subject values binary lotteries over pairs of the cer-
tificates while observing her previous valuations of the certificates themselves. The
3Based on evidence on valuing single versus multiple items, Simonsohn argues that if subjects in the
baseline treatment observe both gift certificates, they will be likely to value the worse one lower, which
could help alleviate IA violation.
4Simonsohn attributes this result to Keren and Willemsen’s test being hard to understand. We note that
the two comprehension tests are logically but perhaps not behaviorally equivalent, which might have also
contributed to the difference in the comprehension rates.
5Simonsohn cannot assess whether IA violation occurred in Experiment 2 since he did not elicit the WTP
for the worse gift certificate. The author draws further conclusions based on relating the subjects’ WTP
for the gift-certificate lottery to their WTP for one-year deferred payment (elicited before the lottery treat-
ment). However, we see no a priori reason why the two WTP valuations should be related and thus find
the author’s conclusions unsubstantiated.
6The certificates feature a luxurious weekend vacation, a gourmand dinner, and a choice between a fine
bottle of wine and a box of gourmet chocolate.
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valuations are elicited using a sequence of six-bidder Vickrey auctions (the proba-
bility of an auction being played out is about 5%). The lotteries, involving various
probability mixes, are described verbally using the lottery-ticket terminology and pie
charts. Subjects are invited to participate in the subsequent lottery draw carried out
by volunteer subjects secretly choosing numbers that are then compared to randomly
generated numbers. Sonsino finds that in almost 12% of cases, subjects value a lot-
tery less than they value either of the lottery’s outcomes, and 27% of subjects do
so at least once. IA violations occur more frequently when the probability of win-
ning the lottery’s better outcome is decreased, contrary to GLW’s study where IA
violations occur only for equiprobable or similar lotteries. Sonsino’s striking results
could at least partly stem from the web-based nature of the experiment (potentially
compromising experimental control), the auction-based elicitation mechanism, or the
sequential nature of the valuations possibly generating order effects. Also, the verbal
lottery description and the lengthy description of the lottery draw could have been
misinterpreted by some subjects and contributed to what Sonsino calls “lottery aver-
sion.”7
We see the main contribution of our replication study in the use of the physical lot-
tery format. Combined with giving subjects complete information about the goods to
be valued, our implementation reduces the scope for misinterpretation to a minimum
and sets the ground for “clean” replication of GLW’s tasks. We do not claim that the
IA violations documented in GLW arose from misinterpretation, nor can we prove
or disprove this conjecture. We are open to the possibility that the consistent differ-
ences between our, GLW’s, and other findings arise from implementation differences
detailed below.
Another virtue of our replication study is that we conduct it under relatively
more controlled experimental conditions. Both Keren and Willemsen (2009) and
Simonsohn (2009) conduct their replications as part of a series of experiments of
unknown (related) nature and order, while Sonsino’s (2008) experiment is web-
based. Moreover, our most extensive replication task uses substantial monetary
incentives, whereas the other replication studies were hypothetical or low-stakes,
and hence likely afflicted by unnecessary noise (e.g., Hertwig and Ortmann 2001;
Rydval and Ortmann 2004).
2 Design and implementation
We replicated three tasks for which GLW document IA violations: hypothetical pric-
ing of bookstore gift certificates, real-stakes pricing of bookstore gift certificates, and
hypothetical pricing of one-year deferred payments. For each task, a lottery treat-
ment (L) elicited willingness to pay (henceforth WTP) for an equiprobable binary
7Sonsino (2008) argues that IA violation could be triggered by subjects’ aversion to the presented lotteries
per se. In his post-experimental questionnaire, “aversion to lotteries” was the most frequently chosen
explanation for IA violation. Subjects were shown an example of within-subjects IA violation and, if
admitting to the (hypothetical) possibility of exhibiting such behavior, were prompted to choose their
preferred explanation for the behavior from a list of three options, the other two being “noise distraction”
and “other explanations.”
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Table 1 Design matrix of pricing tasks and treatments
Task Lottery treatments Baseline treatments
Hypothetical pricing of gift certificates Lreplication
Lrewording
Lphysical Bphysical
Real-stakes pricing of gift certificates Lsym Bsym-wide
Lasym Bsym-narrow
Hypothetical pricing of deferred payments Ldphysical Bdphysical
Ldsym Bdsym-wide
Ldasym Bdsym-narrow
lottery over two gift certificates or deferred payments with a face value of x and 2x.
A corresponding baseline treatment (B) elicited WTP for the worse gift certificate or
deferred payment with a face value of x.8 As in GLW, all comparisons between a
lottery treatment and a corresponding baseline treatment drew on a between-subjects
design. Towards a better understanding of our results, we ran several lottery and base-
line treatments for each task, as is explained below and outlined in Table 1.
2.1 Hypothetical pricing of bookstore gift certificates
As mentioned above, our study was initially motivated by the concern that some sub-
jects might have misinterpreted GLW’s lottery instructions. Hence we conducted a
lottery treatment Lreplication using GLW’s instructions, where subjects valued a lot-
tery ticket that had gift certificates worth x and 2x as the equiprobable outcomes.
In another lottery treatment Lrewording, we aimed to make the instructions less am-
biguous by asking subjects to value a gift certificate worth either x or 2x with equal
probability (described as a fair-coin toss).9 We used gift certificates for one of the
largest bookstores in the Czech Republic (Luxor Book Palace) located within walk-
ing distance of the experimental site. As in GLW, the certificates were valid for the
next two weeks. These initial lottery treatments, discussed in more detail in Ortmann
et al. (2007), appear at the top of Table 1.
We found that our rewording essentially eliminated the possibility of IA violation:
84% of valuations in Lrewording were at or above the face value of the worse gift certifi-
cate. Hence we thought that running a baseline treatment corresponding to Lrewording
and Lreplication was unnecessary. In retrospect, running this baseline treatment would
have deepened our understanding of the conditions under which IA violation occurs,
namely whether we could replicate GLW’s results in Lreplication. We address this issue
in more detail in Sect. 3.1.
8Our design therefore does not address the possibility that lotteries are valued more than their best out-
comes, though Sonsino (2008) shows this can happen in very rare cases (in 0.75% of observations).
9View the experimental instructions at www.econ.mpg.de/english/staff/esi/rydval.
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As another potential caveat of our initial findings, we could not rule out the possi-
bility that our rewording itself induced some form of misinterpretation of the lottery
structure. In order to reduce the scope for misinterpretation to a minimum, we imple-
mented Lphysical and all additional lottery treatments in Table 1 using the following
physical lottery format.10
While reading the lottery instructions aloud, the experimenter presented a bag into
which he placed the two gift certificates and demonstrated how one certificate was
to be randomly drawn from the closed bag. The instructions explained that the two
certificates were identical except for their value (subjects were invited to verify the
claim when inspecting the circulated certificates) and thus the chances of drawing
either the better or the worse certificate would be equal. Subjects were then asked to
state their WTP for the opportunity of drawing one gift certificate from the bag.
Lphysical and the corresponding baseline treatment Bphysical also used Luxor
Book Palace gift certificates which, however, were described in more detail than in
Lreplication and Lrewording. The instructions stated that the certificates were valid for
the next three months and allowed in-store and online purchase of books (including
CD and DVD formats), maps, stationery, etc.11 The experimenter circulated among
subjects several certificates with the appropriate face value in order to ensure com-
mon knowledge and enhance credibility. He also mentioned other conditions of use
of the certificates, such as cash not being returned if a purchase falls below the certifi-
cates’ face value, and the possibility of using the certificates to co-finance purchases
exceeding their face value.
Following GLW, our instructions asked subjects to state the highest price they
would be willing to pay. One can imagine a procedurally more incentive-compatible
mechanism for hypothetical WTP elicitation, such as a hypothetical-stakes version
of the real-stakes mechanism described in the next section. However, we wanted to
retain the key features of GLW’s hypothetical-stakes design for which the authors
observed IA violations. We hoped—as implicitly did the authors of the other afore-
mentioned hypothetical studies—that the (potential) hypothetical bias would not in-
teract with the lottery and baseline treatments in a way that biases the treatment effect
towards or away from IA violation.
2.2 Real-stakes pricing of bookstore gift certificates
Except for the real-stakes implementation, the lottery and baseline treatments in the
penultimate row of Table 1 were constructed in analogy to Lphysical and Bphysical, re-
spectively. That is, the lottery treatments were implemented using the physical lottery
10Using a physical lottery format to study sources of risky decision anomalies is not a novel idea. In
Grether and Plott (1979, Sect. 2), for instance, a physical lottery demonstration did not alleviate preference
reversals. In Gigerenzer et al. (1988, Experiment 1), by contrast, a physical demonstration of random
sampling lessened base rate neglect significantly.
11The three-month validity period of the gift certificates is longer than the two-week period in our initial
two lottery treatments, GLW, Keren and Willemsen (2009), and presumably also Simonsohn (2009). The
discrepancy was imposed on us by the bookstore’s current policy. For completeness, Sonsino’s (2008) gift
certificates were valid for the next 6 months.
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format,12 and all treatments (lottery and baseline) provided subjects with complete
information about the gift certificates (see the previous section for details).
We used the multiple price list (MPL) mechanism to elicit WTP. In treatments
Lsym and Bsym-wide, subjects received 2x for participating. They were asked to indicate
(by circling either Yes or No) their willingness to pay the listed prices rising from 0.1x
to 2x in 0.1x increments. Subjects were informed that only one of their 20 decisions
would be payoff-relevant. Each subject eventually randomly drew a card from a box
with cards numbered 1 to 20 to determine the payoff-relevant row. If the subject
circled Yes in that row, she paid the price and received the gift certificate worth x
(in Bsym-wide) or randomly drew a certificate from a bag containing two certificates
worth x and 2x (in Lsym). If she circled No in the payoff-relevant row, she earned the
participation fee.
We ran a supplementary baseline treatment Bsym-narrow with a narrower MPL rang-
ing from 0.1x to x; subjects received x for participating and made only 10 Yes-or-
No decisions. This MPL procedure seems more natural for valuing a good worth x.
However, if subjects were drawn towards the middle of the MPL, Bsym-narrow could
(ceteris paribus) induce lower WTP valuations and hence work against the occur-
rence of IA violation. We accounted for the potential bias caused by the “mid-table”
effect by comparing valuations in Lsym and Bsym-wide which both have the same wide
MPL. Moreover, comparing valuations in Bsym-wide and Bsym-narrow told us whether
the mid-table effect was actually present in the baseline treatments.
We also conducted a supplementary lottery treatment Lasym where, similar to An-
dersen et al. (2007) and Harrison et al. (2007), the MPL was asymmetrically “skewed
low” in that the mid-row price was below the mean of the MPL (in fact below 0.8x). If
the mid-table effect were present, Lasym should (ceteris paribus) induce lower WTP
valuations and hence favor IA violation. Thus one reason for implementing Lasym
was to give IA violation a fair chance to occur in our data. Furthermore, comparing
valuations in Lsym and Lasym told us whether the mid-table effect was present in the
lottery treatments.13,14
We preferred the MPL mechanism to the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM)
mechanism used by GLW. Any incentive-compatible mechanism should serve the
goal of assessing the direction of the lottery-baseline treatment effect (i.e., the oc-
currence of IA violation or lack thereof), unless the mechanism interacts with the
lottery and baseline treatments in a way that biases the treatment effect. Given
the well-known concerns with the BDM mechanism (e.g., Karni and Safra 1987;
Harrison 1992; Horowitz 2006), and having explicitly accounted for the potential
12We were unable to obtain gift certificates worth 2x, so we used two identical table tennis balls marked
x and 2x to represent the real gift certificates. Subjects were informed that if they drew a ball marked 2x,
they would receive two gift certificates worth x.
13Up to 1.4x, the MPL in Lasym and Lsym share all prices, and even above 1.4x, it turns out that no subject
in Lsym made a valuation that could not have been made in Lasym . In this sense, comparing the two WTP
distributions is innocuous.
14While our variation of the real-stakes lottery and baseline treatments may have induced other behavioral
effects, such as changing the effective power of financial incentives, we cannot find a reason why any such
effect should work against the occurrence of IA violation.
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bias caused by the mid-table effect, we concluded that the MPL mechanism was a
less problematic choice.
There are refinements of our basic MPL procedure that, for example, allow sub-
jects to express indifference and elicit WTP more precisely by iteratively decreasing
the MPL price increments (e.g., Andersen et al. 2007). However, given our focus on
the direction of the lottery-baseline treatment effect (rather than on WTP point esti-
mates), the benefits of such refinements in our view do not outweigh their potential
costs arising from the increased complexity of the elicitation procedure. Our MPL
price increments of 0.1x (about $1) seem fine enough to lessen concerns related to
the interval-censored nature of MPL responses, which we in any case address sta-
tistically.15 Also, our subjects could fill out the MPL in a non-monotonic manner to
(among other things) indicate indifference. We tackle these (very rare) cases by using
wider price intervals to represent the affected subjects’ WTP, and we always do so in
a way that favors the occurrence of IA violation.
2.3 Hypothetical pricing of one-year deferred payments
Except for different goods to be valued, the lottery and baseline treatments in the last
row of Table 1 were constructed in analogy to Lphysical and Bphysical, respectively: All
the lottery treatments were implemented using the physical lottery format, and we
asked subjects in all treatments (lottery and baseline) to state the highest price they
would be willing to pay (see Sect. 2.1 for details).
We used hypothetical payment forms guaranteeing cash payment in one year from
the date of the experiment. The instructions explained that the deferred payment
would (in a real-stakes scenario) be guaranteed by the research organization financ-
ing the experiment. We circulated several (hypothetically filled out) payment forms
of the research organization for subjects’ inspection. While reading the instructions
aloud, the experimenter also mentioned that the deferred cash payment would (in a
real-stakes scenario) be made by one of the experimenters at the experimental site.
The deferred-payment task contained a within-subjects component: It was con-
ducted as a “surprise” task directly following the hypothetical and real-stakes
pricing of gift certificates. In particular, the deferred-payment lottery treatments
Ldphysical, Ldsym and Ldasym differed from each other only in that they followed
different gift-certificate lottery treatments, namely Lphysical, Lsym and Lasym, re-
spectively. Similarly, the deferred-payment baseline treatments Bdphysical, Bdsym-wide
and Bdsym-narrow were conducted after subjects completed Bphysical, Bsym-wide and
Bsym-narrow, respectively.
While the instructions for the deferred-payment treatments reminded subjects that
they faced a new task unrelated to the gift-certificate treatments just completed, the
gift-certificate valuation undoubtedly influenced the subsequent deferred-payment
valuation in some manner. Given the variety of the gift-certificate lottery (base-
line) treatments preceding the deferred-payment lottery (baseline) treatments, we can
15There is also controversy as to whether WTP can actually be elicited as precisely as required by mech-
anisms eliciting point-estimate responses, such as the BDM mechanism or the hypothetical elicitation
mechanism used in our and GLW’s hypothetical pricing tasks. See, for example, Andersen et al. (2007)
for further discussion.
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study this influence in a systematic manner in Sect. 3.3. For this reason, we do not
view the deferred-payment valuations as less informative than the gift-certificate val-
uations.
2.4 Other implementation details
The experimental sessions were run in a pen-and-paper format (as in GLW) and were
conducted in Czech by the first author. All parts of the experiment were anonymous
and payments as well as lottery draws (if any) were done privately outside the lab
at the end of a session. Including an initial demographic questionnaire, hypothetical
sessions lasted about 20 minutes while real-stakes sessions lasted slightly longer.
Subjects earned 100 CZK (about $5) for participating in the hypothetical sessions;
the participation fee was 400 CZK or 200 CZK in sessions involving the real-stakes
task (see Sect. 2.2 for reasons).
In the hypothetical pricing of gift certificates, x = 500 CZK (about $25), thus
roughly matching the (student) purchasing power of x = $50 used in GLW. In the
hypothetical pricing of deferred payments, we also used x = 500 CZK to make the
two hypothetical pricing tasks comparable (GLW used x = $100). In the real-stakes
pricing of gift certificates, x = 200 CZK (about $10) and all subjects’ decisions were
played out, while GLW used x = $50 and played out the decisions of 5% of the
subjects (one subject per session). Note that x = 200 CZK is still a substantial amount
of money, exceeding the price of almost half of the books and textbooks and a much
larger proportion of the stationery items sold at the bookstore’s online shop.
The initial two lottery treatments (Lreplication and Lrewording) were conducted in
early April 2007. The subjects were 64 students from the Faculty of Social Sciences
of the Charles University in Prague, recruited using posters. The other treatments
presented in this study were conducted in early December 2008.16 The subjects were
150 students from various Prague universities recruited online using ORSEE (Greiner
2004). Just above a third of them were students from various branches of engineering,
one quarter were students of finance, business, management or accounting, another
quarter were economists, and the remainder came from other fields. Overall, subjects
were 18 to 30 years old with the mean and median age of 22 years, and 67% of them
were males. No subject participated in our replication study more than once.
3 Results
Table 2 displays WTP summary statistics for the various treatments. To facilitate
casual comparison of valuations across tasks, all WTP figures are reported as per-
centages of x, the face value of the worse gift certificate or deferred payment. Table 3
reports unconditional tests for the lottery-baseline treatment effect (t-test, Wilcoxon
rank-sum test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) as well as Wald tests that condition on
16There were nine sessions, conducted in a quasi-random (but predetermined) order over four consecutive
working days.
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the collected demographic characteristics (age, gender, year and field of study, and a
wealth proxy based on family car ownership).17
3.1 Hypothetical pricing of gift certificates
As mentioned above, we initially conducted the lottery treatments Lreplication and
Lrewording. Their implementation was closest to that of GLW, but differed from all
subsequent treatments in terms of lottery representation, the gift certificates’ descrip-
tion and validity period, subject pool composition, and implementation date (see
Sects. 2.1 and 2.4). Since these implementation differences could affect valuations
of gift certificates, we report the results for these initial lottery treatments separately.
WTP is significantly higher in Lrewording compared to Lreplication, as shown in
Row 1 of Table 3. Moreover, Table 2 displays that the confidence intervals for WTP
mean and median in Lrewording are above the face value of the worse gift certificate.
Inspection of the individual-level data further reveals that 84% of the WTP valuations
match or exceed the face value. We originally viewed these results as demonstrating
sufficiently that Lrewording eliminated the possibility of IA violation, and did not run
the baseline treatment corresponding to Lrewording and Lreplication. As a consequence,
we cannot directly assess whether the IA is violated for Lreplication. Yet, since the
WTP valuations in Lreplication are centered just below the face value of the worse gift
certificate and 53% of them match or exceed the face value, observing IA violation
for Lreplication would have been possible but unlikely.
As mentioned in Sect. 2.1, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that the
high valuations in Lrewording resulted from misinterpretation of our reworded lottery
instructions. Thus we now turn to evidence from treatments using the physical lottery
format. As shown in Row 2 of Table 3, WTP is significantly higher in Lphysical than
in Bphysical. While clearly supporting the IA, one should not overstate the result given
the relatively small sample sizes involved, especially in Bphysical. The main purpose
of conducting Lphysical and Bphysical was to complement the suggestive yet debatable
evidence from Lreplication and Lrewording. In our mind, the strongest evidence in sup-
port of the IA comes from the real-stakes gift-certificate task reported on in the next
section.
3.2 Real-stakes pricing of gift certificates18
We first assess the extent of the mid-table effect. Lasym has lower WTP valuations
compared to Lsym, which points in the direction of the mid-table effect. However, the
difference is small and far from significant, as shown in Row 3 of Table 3. There is
more sizeable evidence for the mid-table effect in the baseline treatments, but WTP
17Some of the tests may be deemed more appropriate than others depending on how one views the nature
of the data—see also footnote 15.
18We excluded three incomplete responses that clearly indicated misunderstanding of the MPL valuation
procedure, one in a lottery treatment and two in a baseline treatment. Also, two subjects entered a
non-monotonic MPL response, namely a single No response surrounded by Yes responses. For these
one-off cases of non-monotonicity, we recoded the non-monotonic No response as a Yes response, which
favors IA violation since both subjects happened to be in a baseline treatment.
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valuations are not significantly lower in Bsym-narrow than in Bsym-wide, as shown in
Row 4 of Table 3.
The lottery-baseline treatment effect can be assessed in several ways. One can pool
lottery treatments Lsym and Lasym and baseline treatments Bsym-wide and Bsym-narrow,
which yields confidence intervals for WTP mean of (74.83, 92.91) and (56.57, 69.85),
respectively (see Table 2). Hence the pooled lottery-baseline treatment effect is
clearly in the direction of the IA, as confirmed in Row 5 of Table 3. Alternatively,
one can make stricter treatment comparisons that favor IA violation, for example
by excluding Bsym-narrow (see Row 6 of Table 3), or by contrasting only Lasym with
Bsym-wide (see Row 7 of Table 3). Even these stricter comparisons provide support for
the IA.
A casual comparison of the hypothetical and real-stakes gift-certificate valuations
(excluding Lreplication and Lrewording from the comparison for reasons outlined in the
previous section) reveals that there is a minor upward hypothetical bias in both the
lottery and baseline treatments, in line with the direction in which hypothetical bias
typically seems to work (e.g., Harrison and Rutstroem 2008). By contrast, a similar
comparison of GLW’s hypothetical and real-stakes gift-certificate valuations suggests
a much stronger downward hypothetical bias in both the lottery and baseline treat-
ments.
3.3 Hypothetical pricing of deferred payments
The lottery-baseline treatment effect can again be assessed in several ways. Follow-
ing up on the lottery-baseline comparisons performed in the previous two sections,
Table 2 shows that WTP valuations are higher in Ldphysical compared to Bdphysical,
and also in both Ldsym and Ldasym compared to Bdsym-wide and Bdsym-narrow. Alter-
natively, pooling all lottery treatments and all baseline treatments yields confidence
intervals for WTP mean of (70.28, 87.66) and (41.62, 54.89), respectively, as shown
in the last two rows of Table 2. Hence the pooled lottery-baseline treatment effect
is clearly in the direction of the IA, as confirmed in Row 8 of Table 3. One can also
make a separate lottery-baseline comparison for the deferred-payment treatments fol-
lowing the real-stakes gift-certificate task (see Row 9 of Table 3) and those following
the hypothetical gift-certificate task (see Row 10 of Table 3), which also provides
support for the IA.
We next examine the potential influence of subjects’ gift-certificate valuations on
their subsequent deferred-payment valuations. Casual inspection of Table 2 suggests
that the mean WTP is always lower in a deferred-payment treatment compared to the
preceding gift-certificate treatment. Further, in terms of the mean WTP, the deferred-
payment treatments are ordered identically to the gift-certificate treatments. As an-
other aggregate-level observation, deferred-payment valuations are overall higher
when preceded by hypothetical rather than real-stakes gift-certificate valuations (see
Row 11 of Table 3), which could be a corollary of the minor upward hypothetical bias
discussed in Sect. 3.2. At the individual level, however, subjects’ deferred-payment
valuations do not simply reflect their preceding gift-certificate valuations: Spearman’s
correlation coefficient between the two valuations ranges (across treatments) between
0.27 and 0.60. The correlation is generally higher for lottery treatments than for the
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corresponding baseline treatments, which may be due to risk attitudes affecting both
of a subject’s lottery valuations whereas the baseline valuations lack this common
factor.
4 Discussion and conclusion
We observe that the internality axiom is supported in all three tasks: Subjects’ will-
ingness to pay for equiprobable binary lotteries is significantly higher than other sub-
jects’ willingness to pay for the lotteries’ worse outcomes, regardless of whether
subjects’ valuations are real-stakes or hypothetical and whether the outcomes are gift
certificates or deferred payments.
Our replication of GLW’s tasks rests on using a physical lottery format and on pro-
viding subjects with complete information about the goods they are to value, which
arguably renders misinterpretation of the tasks unlikely. However, we do not (and
cannot) conclude that these implementation differences, rather than other ones, are
primarily responsible for why our results differ from those of GLW and the other
aforementioned replication studies.19
For instance, we had no choice but using different local bookstore gift certificates
with a longer validity period, and different language of instructions. The calendar
time of implementing the task could also play a role, though our results point in the
same direction for the two different implementation dates. Our findings could also
be specific to our subject pool, though conditioning on the collected demographic
characteristics leaves the results qualitatively unchanged. Naturally, replicating our
implementation of GLW’s tasks in other subject pools would provide a useful robust-
ness check of our results.
We do not want to draw too strong a conclusion about the reality of internality
axiom violation and hence the uncertainty effect. Nor do we wish to dispute GLW’s
view that their tasks involve high cognitive demands and perception of uncertainty,
possibly triggering a lottery valuation process incompatible with normative risky de-
cision theories, or triggering what Sonsino (2008) calls lottery aversion. Nevertheless,
in our implementation of GLW’s tasks, lottery valuation processes incompatible with
the internality axiom seem not prevalent.
Converging lines of research in psychology suggest that “experiencing” infor-
mation (e.g., sampling outcomes from payoff distributions, experiencing base rates,
etc.), as opposed to encountering symbolic descriptions thereof, can strongly influ-
ence people’s reasoning and judgments (e.g., Gigerenzer et al. 1988; Weber et al.
1993; Koehler 1996; Hertwig et al. 2004). The effect of our physical lottery imple-
mentation could be another manifestation of this finding.
Acknowledgements We thank Pavlo Blavatskyy, Jordi Brandts, John Duffy, Uri Gneezy, Glenn Harri-
son, John List, Doron Sonsino, Tim Salmon, Lise Vesterlund, George Wu, participants of the ESA World
Meeting 2007 at LUISS in Rome, and an anonymous referee for comments. This research was partly
19IA violation could in principle arise from genuinely higher gift-certificate or deferred-payment valua-
tions in a baseline treatment compared to a corresponding lottery treatment, especially if coupled with high
risk aversion of subjects in the lottery treatment. However, this scenario cannot account for the systematic
differences between our results and those of other studies.
How certain is the uncertainty effect? 487
supported by a research center grant No. LC542 of the Ministry of Education of the Czech Republic
implemented at CERGE-EI—a joint workplace of the Center for Economic Research and Graduate Edu-
cation, Charles University, Prague, and the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech
Republic. Ortmann (Senior Researcher at the Economics Institute) acknowledges support of the grant No.
MSM0021620846 from the Czech Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports. Hertwig acknowledges sup-
port of the Swiss National Science Foundation Grant 100014-118283. The usual caveats apply.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Andersen, S., Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I., & Rutstrom, E. E. (2007). Valuation using multiple price list
formats. Applied Economics, 39(6), 675–682.
Gigerenzer, G., Hell, W., & Blank, H. (1988). Presentation and content: The use of base rates as a con-
tinuous variable. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 14(3),
513–525.
Gneezy, U., List, J. A., & Wu, G. (2006). The uncertainty effect: When a risky prospect is valued less than
its worst outcome. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4), 1283–1309.
Greiner, B. (2004). The online recruitment system ORSEE 2.0—A guide for the organization of experiments
in economics. University of Cologne, Working Paper Series in Economics 10.
Grether, D. M., & Plott, C. R. (1979). Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon.
American Economic Review, 69(4), 623–638.
Harrison, G. W. (1992). Theory and misbehavior of first-price auctions: Reply. American Economic Re-
view, 82(5), 1426–1443.
Harrison, G. W., & Rutstroem, E. E. (2008). Experimental evidence on the existence of hypothetical bias in
value elicitation methods. In C. R. Plott & V. L. Smith (Eds.), Handbook of experimental economics
results (Vol. 1). Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Harrison, G. W., List, J. A., & Towe, C. (2007). Naturally occurring preferences and exogenous laboratory
experiments: A case study of risk aversion. Econometrica, 75(2), 433–458.
Hertwig, R., & Ortmann, A. (2001). Experimental practices in economics: A methodological challenge for
psychologists? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(3), 383–402.
Hertwig, R., Barron, G., Weber, E. U., & Erev, I. (2004). Decisions from experience and the effect of rare
events in risky choice. Psychological Science, 15(8), 534–539.
Horowitz, J. K. (2006). The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism is not necessarily incentive compati-
ble, even for non-random goods. Economics Letters, 93(1), 6–11.
Karni, E., & Safra, Z. (1987). Preference reversals and the observability of preferences by experimental
methods. Econometrica, 55(3), 675–685.
Keren, G., & Willemsen, M. C. (2009). Decision anomalies, experimenter assumptions, and participants’
comprehension: Re-evaluating the uncertainty effect. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 22(3),
301–317.
Koehler, J. J. (1996). The base rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive, normative, and methodological chal-
lenges. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19(1), 1–53.
Ortmann, A., Prokosheva, S., Rydval, O., & Hertwig, R. (2007). Valuing a risky prospect less than its
worst outcome: Uncertainty effect or task ambiguity? Jena Economic Research Paper 2007-038 and
CERGE-EI Working Paper 334.
Rydval, O., & Ortmann, A. (2004). How financial incentives and cognitive abilities affect task performance
in laboratory settings: An illustration. Economics Letters, 85(3), 315–320.
Simonsohn, U. (2009). Direct risk aversion: Evidence from risky prospects valued below their worst out-
come. Psychological Science, 20(6), 686–692.
Sonsino, D. (2008). Disappointment aversion in internet bidding-decisions. Theory and Decision, 64(2–3),
363–393.
Weber, E. U., Böckenholt, U., Hilton, D. J., & Wallace, B. (1993). Determinants of diagnostic hypothesis
generation: Effects of information, base rates, and experience. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 19(5), 1151–1164.
